

Revision and Conditional Inference for Abstract Dialectical Frameworks

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Abstract

For propositional beliefs, there are well-established connections between belief revision, defeasible conditionals and nonmonotonic inference. In argumentative contexts, such connections have not yet been investigated. On the one hand, the exact relationship between formal argumentation and nonmonotonic inference relations is a research topic that keeps on eluding researchers despite recently intensified efforts, whereas argumentative revision has been studied in numerous works during recent years. In this paper, we show that similar relationships between belief revision, defeasible conditionals and nonmonotonic inference hold in argumentative contexts as well. We first define revision operators for abstract dialectical frameworks, and use such revision operators to define dynamic conditionals by means of the Ramsey test. We show that such conditionals can be equivalently defined using a total preorder over three-valued interpretations, and study the inferential behaviour of the resulting conditional inference relations.

1 Introduction

Belief revision, defeasible conditionals and nonmonotonic inference relations form a triangle of strongly connected concepts within knowledge representation. *Conditionals* (Nute 1984) have been a cause of concern for philosophers for the better part of the history of philosophy, but within the formal logical study of conditionals, in the last semi-century, a lot of progress has been made. A central idea in the study of conditionals is that in the evaluation of a conditional “if ϕ then ψ ” (formally, $(\psi|\phi)$), it suffices to check for the validity of ψ in a certain subset of all models of ϕ . This is often modelled using a selection function over the set of possible worlds Ω : $f : \Omega \times \wp(\Omega) \rightarrow \wp(\Omega)$. A conditional $(\psi|\phi)$ is then true at a world ω according to a selection function f iff every world in $f(\omega, [\phi])$ validates ψ . *Nonmonotonic inference relations* (Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor 1990; Shoham 1987), on the other hand, have been studied semantically using a *preference relation* \preceq over the set of possible worlds. A nonmonotonic inference $\phi \sim \psi$ is then valid iff ψ holds in all \preceq -minimal ϕ -worlds. The relations between conditionals and nonmonotonic inference relations are clear, then, as \min_{\preceq} can be viewed as a selection function. As such, a conditional inference relation \sim can be associated with a nonmonotonic inference relation s.t. $\preceq \sim (\psi|\phi)$ iff

$\phi \sim \psi$. *Belief revision* studies the effect of the dynamics of propositional beliefs, and the consolidation of belief revision as a field of study is often identified with the formulation of the *AGM-theory* (Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson 1985) of belief revision. Close relationships between belief revision and conditional logics were noticed by means of the *Ramsey test* (Ramsey 1931), which also gave rise to impossibility results on the compatibility of belief revision and conditional reasoning (Gärdenfors 1986). However, when (Katsuno and Mendelzon 1991) showed that total preorders underlie AGM-belief revision in a fundamental and inevitable way, it was at once also established that belief revision, conditional logic and nonmonotonic inference were shown to be fully compatible. They can thus be seen as three different sides of a single topic or mode of reasoning (Gärdenfors 1990; Makinson 1993), at least when restricted to propositional beliefs. Indeed, when moving to other kinds of belief revision (e.g. (Hansson 1999; Delgrande and Peppas 2015)), weaker kinds of conditionals (Hawthorne 2007; Makinson 2011) or other forms of nonmonotonic inference, these interrelations tend to break down.

Another important field in knowledge representation is *formal argumentation*. Argumentative reasoning is usually perceived as a specific form of nonmonotonic reasoning (see e.g. (Rienstra 2014; Booth et al. 2012; Booth et al. 2013)) but attempts to transform reasoning systems from one side into systems of the other side have been revealing gaps that could not be closed (cf., e.g., (Thimm and Kern-Isberner 2008; Kern-Isberner and Simari 2011; Heyninck 2019)). Therefore, in spite of the abundance of existing work studying connections between the two fields, a general way of obtaining well-behaved non-monotonic conditional inference relations on the basis of argumentative contexts has not been defined yet. On the other hand, belief dynamics in general and belief revision in particular has been studied intensively for formal argumentation. Therefore, in this paper we make a systematic and general attempt to answer the question as to whether belief revision, nonmonotonic inference relations and defeasible conditionals form an interconnected triangle in an argumentative context as they do in a propositional setting. We answer this question for *Abstract Dialectical Frameworks* (ADFs) (Brewka et al. 2013), an approach to formal argumentation, which subsumes many other argumentative formalisms in a generic,




Figure 1: Graphical Representation of connections between belief revision, nonmonotonic inference and conditional logics. A full line means there is a full correspondence between the two concepts, whereas a dashed line means that there is additional information needed for a full correspondence. E.g. to define a belief revision operator on the basis of a nonmonotonic inference relation one needs to additionally assume a context K which corresponds to ϕ , see e.g. (Makinson and Gärdenfors 1991).

logic-based way.

In this paper, we investigate connections between belief revision, nonmonotonic inference and defeasible conditionals within abstract dialectical argumentation. We first define and study revision of ADFs in depth and then use these revisions to define conditional inference for ADFs. Then, we define dynamic nonmonotonic inference relations based on the *Ramsey test* (Ramsey 1931). We study these inference relations in terms of rationality postulates known from defeasible conditionals. We accordingly summarize the contributions of this paper as follows: (1) definition of belief revision of ADFs by formulas, (2) a semantical characterisation of such revision operators in terms of total preorders over three-valued interpretations, (3) the definition of *dynamic conditional inference relations* for ADFs based on the Ramsey test, and (4) a study of dynamic conditional inference relations in terms of postulates known from defeasible conditionals.

Outline of this Paper: We first state all the necessary preliminaries in Section 2 on propositional logic (Section 2.1), three-valued logic (Section 2.2), reasoning with non-monotonic conditionals (Section 2.3), propositional revision (Section 2.4) and abstract dialectical argumentation (Section 2.5). We then define revision of ADFs under various semantics, in particular under the preferred semantics (Section 3.3) and the grounded semantics (Section 3.4). Thereafter, in Section 4, we define and study dynamic conditionals based on such revisions. We compare our approach with related work in Section 5.

2 Preliminaries

In the following, we briefly recall some general preliminaries on propositional logic, as well as technical details on conditional logic and ADFs (Brewka et al. 2013).

2.1 Propositional Logic

For a set At of atoms let $\mathcal{L}(At)$ be the corresponding propositional language constructed using the usual connectives \wedge (*and*), \vee (*or*), \neg (*negation*) and \rightarrow (*material implication*). A (classical) *interpretation* (also called *possible*

world) ω for a propositional language $\mathcal{L}(At)$ is a function $\omega : At \rightarrow \{\top, \text{F}\}$. Let $\Omega(At)$ denote the set of all interpretations for At . We simply write Ω if the set of atoms is implicitly given. An interpretation ω *satisfies* (or is a *model* of) an atom $a \in At$, denoted by $\omega \models a$, if and only if $\omega(a) = \top$. The satisfaction relation \models is extended to formulas as usual. As an abbreviation we sometimes identify an interpretation ω with its *complete conjunction*, i.e., if $a_1, \dots, a_n \in At$ are those atoms that are assigned \top by ω and $a_{n+1}, \dots, a_m \in At$ are those propositions that are assigned F by ω we identify ω by $a_1 \dots a_n \overline{a_{n+1}} \dots \overline{a_m}$ (or any permutation of this). For example, the interpretation ω_1 on $\{a, b, c\}$ with $\omega_1(a) = \omega_1(c) = \top$ and $\omega_1(b) = \text{F}$ is abbreviated by $a\overline{b}c$. For $\Phi \subseteq \mathcal{L}(At)$ we also define $\omega \models \Phi$ if and only if $\omega \models \phi$ for every $\phi \in \Phi$. Define the set of models $\text{Mod}(X) = \{\omega \in \Omega(At) \mid \omega \models X\}$ for every formula or set of formulas X . A formula or set of formulas X_1 *entails* another formula or set of formulas X_2 , denoted by $X_1 \vdash X_2$, if $\text{Mod}(X_1) \subseteq \text{Mod}(X_2)$.

2.2 Kleenes Three-Valued Logic

A 3-valued interpretation for a set of atoms At is a function $v : S \rightarrow \{\top, \perp, u\}$, which assigns to each atom in At either the value \top (true, accepted), \perp (false, rejected), or u (unknown). The set of all three-valued interpretations for a set of atoms At is denoted by $\mathcal{V}(At)$. We sometimes denote an interpretation $v \in \mathcal{V}(\{x_1, \dots, x_n\})$ by $\dagger_1 \dots \dagger_n$ with $v(x_i) = \dagger_i$ and $\dagger_i \in \{\top, \perp, u\}$, e.g. $\top\top$ denotes $v(a) = v(b) = \top$. A 3-valued interpretation v can be extended to arbitrary propositional formulas $\phi \in \mathcal{L}(At)$ via the truth tables in Table 1. We furthermore extend the language with a second, *weak negation* \sim , which is evaluated to true if there is no positive information for the negated formula (i.e. the negated formula is false or undecided) and thus expresses non-truth, as opposed to \neg which expresses explicit falsity. The truth table for \sim can also be found in Table 1.¹ It will prove convenient to define the connective \odot which stipulates a formula is undecided. We define $\odot\phi = \sim(\neg\phi \vee \phi)$. We define $\mathcal{L}^K(At)$ as the language based on At , the unary connectives $\langle \neg, \sim, \odot \rangle$ and the binary connectives $\langle \wedge, \vee, \rightarrow \rangle$.

We can show that \odot expresses the undecidedness of any formula $\phi \in \mathcal{L}^K$:

Fact 1. For any $\phi \in \mathcal{L}^K(At)$, $v(\odot\phi) = \top$ iff $v(\phi) = u$.

The following facts about \sim will prove useful below:

Fact 2. For any $\phi \in \mathcal{L}^K(At)$ and any $v \in \mathcal{V}(At)$: (1) $v(\sim\phi) \neq u$, and (2) $v(\sim\sim\phi) = \top$ iff $v(\phi) = \top$.

We define the set of three-valued interpretations that satisfy a formula $\phi \in \mathcal{L}^K(At)$ as $\mathcal{V}(\phi) = \{v \in \mathcal{V}(At) \mid v(\phi) = \top\}$. A formula X_1 *K-entails* another formula X_2 , denoted $X_1 \vdash_K X_2$, if $\mathcal{V}(X_1) \subseteq \mathcal{V}(X_2)$. $X_1 \equiv_K X_2$ iff $X_1 \vdash_K X_2$ and $X_2 \vdash_K X_1$.

¹In the terminology of (Urquhart 2001), the negation \sim corresponds to Bochvar's *external negation* (Bochvar and Bergmann 1981) and \neg corresponds to Kleene's negation in his three-valued logic. \sim is also called Kleene's *weak negation* (Varzi and Warglien 2003), since the conditions for $\sim\phi$ being satisfied are weaker than those for $\neg\phi$ being satisfied (i.e. $\{\neg\phi\} \vdash_K \sim\phi$).

	\neg	\sim	\odot		\wedge	\top	u	\perp		\vee	\top	u	\perp
\top	\perp	\perp	\perp	\top	\top	u	\perp	\perp	\top	\top	u	\perp	\perp
u	u	\top	\top	u	u	u	\perp	\perp	u	\top	u	u	\perp
\perp	\top	\top	\perp	\perp	\perp	\perp	\perp	\perp	\perp	\top	u	\perp	\perp

Table 1: Truth-tables for connectives in Kleene's K

Given an interpretation $v \in \mathcal{V}(\text{At})$, we define:

$$\text{form}(v) = \bigwedge_{v(a)=\top} a \wedge \bigwedge_{v(a)=\perp} \neg a \wedge \bigwedge_{v(a)=u} \odot a$$

Clearly, $\text{form}(v)$ expresses exactly the beliefs expressed by a three-valued interpretations:

Fact 3. For any $v \in \mathcal{V}(\text{At})$ and any $a \in \text{At}$: (1) $\text{form}(v) \vdash_{\text{K}} a$ iff $v(a) = \top$; (2) $\text{form}(v) \vdash_{\text{K}} \neg a$ iff $v(a) = \perp$; (3) $\text{form}(v) \vdash_{\text{K}} \odot a$ iff $v(a) = u$.

2.3 Defeasible Inference and Nonmonotonic Conditionals

There are many different conditional logics (cf., e.g., (Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor 1990; Nute 1984)), but a common idea underlying many semantics for nonmonotonic conditionals is that to validate the acceptance of a conditional $(\psi|\phi)$, it suffices to look whether its material counterpart $\phi \rightarrow \psi$ is validated in a subset of possible worlds. In this work, we will assume that a preorder $\preceq_{\subseteq} \wp(\Omega(\text{At}) \times \Omega(\text{At}))$ over the set of possible worlds can be used to encode relevance of the possible worlds w.r.t. evaluation of conditionals. In more detail, we will state that a conditional $(\psi|\phi)$ is accepted in a context encoded by \preceq iff the consequent is validated by all \preceq -minimal worlds models of the antecedent ϕ , in symbols:

$$\text{Mod}(\psi) \supseteq \min_{\preceq}(\text{Mod}(\phi))$$

This is in full compliance with defeasible inference relations $\phi \vdash \psi$ (Makinson 1988) expressing that from ϕ , ψ may be plausibly/defeasibly derived. We say that $\phi \preceq \psi$ iff $\omega \preceq \omega'$ for some $\omega \in \min_{\preceq}(\text{Mod}(\phi))$ and some $\omega' \in \min_{\preceq}(\text{Mod}(\psi))$. This allows for expressing the validity of defeasible inferences via stating that $\phi \vdash \psi$ iff $(\phi \wedge \psi) \prec (\phi \wedge \neg\psi)$. Thus, nonmonotonic conditionals as defined above can be seen as a syntactic counterpart to defeasible inference, in the sense that $(\psi|\phi)$ is accepted in a context encoded by \preceq iff $\phi \vdash \psi$.

Example 1. Consider \preceq defined over $\Omega(\{a, b, c\})$ as follows:

$$abc, ab\bar{c}, a\bar{b}c, \bar{a}bc \prec a\bar{b}\bar{c}, \bar{a}b\bar{c}, \bar{a}\bar{b}c, \bar{a}\bar{b}\bar{c}$$

Thus, for example, $\neg a \vdash \preceq b$, $\neg b \vdash \preceq a$, $\neg a \vee \neg b \vdash \preceq c$, $\top \vdash \preceq a \vee b$ and $a \not\vdash \preceq c$.

We recall some properties of conditional consequence relations (Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor 1990):

(REF)		$\phi \in \mathcal{L}(\text{At})$	implies	$\phi \vdash \phi$	
(CUT)	$\phi \vdash \psi$	and	$\phi \wedge \psi \vdash \gamma$	imply	$\phi \vdash \gamma$
(CM)	$\phi \vdash \psi$	and	$\phi \vdash \gamma$	imply	$\phi \wedge \psi \vdash \gamma$
(RW)	$\phi \vdash \psi$	and	$\psi \models \gamma$	imply	$\phi \vdash \gamma$
(LLE)	$\phi \equiv \psi$	and	$\psi \vdash \gamma$	imply	$\phi \vdash \gamma$
(OR)	$\phi \vdash \gamma$	and	$\psi \vdash \gamma$	imply	$(\phi \vee \psi) \vdash \gamma$
(RM)	$\phi \vdash \gamma$	and	$\phi \not\vdash \neg\psi$	imply	$\phi \wedge \psi \vdash \gamma$

Defeasible inference relations \vdash_{\preceq} based on total preorders \preceq satisfy these properties:

Proposition 1 ((Makinson 1993)). For any total preorder \preceq , \vdash_{\preceq} satisfies (REF), (CUT), (CM), (RW), (LLE), (OR) and (RM).

2.4 Revising Propositional Formulas

We now recall the so-called AGM-approach to belief revision (Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson 1985) as reformulated for propositional formulas by (Katsuno and Mendelzon 1991). The following postulates for revision operators $\star : \mathcal{L} \times \mathcal{L} \rightarrow \mathcal{L}$ are formulated:

- (R1) $\phi \star \psi \vdash \psi$
- (R2) If $\phi \wedge \psi$ is satisfiable, then $\phi \star \psi \equiv \psi \wedge \phi$
- (R3) If ψ is satisfiable, then so is $\phi \star \psi$
- (R4) If $\phi_1 \equiv \phi_2$ and $\psi_1 \equiv \psi_2$, $\phi_1 \star \psi_1 \equiv \phi_2 \star \psi_2$
- (R5) $(\phi \star \psi) \wedge \mu \vdash \phi \star (\psi \wedge \mu)$
- (R6) If $(\phi \star \psi) \wedge \mu$ is satisfiable, then $\phi \star (\psi \wedge \mu) \vdash (\phi \star \psi) \wedge \mu$

An important result is the semantical characterisation of such a belief revision operator. For such a characterisation, a function $f : \mathcal{L}(\text{At}) \rightarrow \wp(\Omega(\text{At}) \times \Omega(\text{At}))$ that assigns to each propositional formula $\phi \in \mathcal{L}$ a preorder \preceq_{ϕ} over $\Omega(\text{At})$.

Definition 1 ((Katsuno and Mendelzon 1991)). Given a formula $\phi \in \mathcal{L}(\text{At})$, a function $f : \mathcal{L}(\text{At}) \rightarrow \wp(\Omega(\text{At}) \times \Omega(\text{At}))$ assigning preorders \preceq_{ϕ} over $\Omega(\text{At})$ to every formula $\phi \in \mathcal{L}(\text{At})$ is faithful iff:

1. For every $\phi \in \mathcal{L}(\text{At})$, if $\omega, \omega' \in \text{Mod}(\phi)$ then $\omega \not\prec_{\phi} \omega'$,
2. For every $\phi \in \mathcal{L}(\text{At})$, if $\omega \in \text{Mod}(\phi)$ and $\omega' \notin \text{Mod}(\phi)$ then $\omega \preceq_{\phi} \omega'$,
3. For every $\phi, \phi' \in \mathcal{L}(\text{At})$, if $\phi \equiv \phi'$ then $\preceq_{\phi} = \preceq_{\phi'}$.

In (Katsuno and Mendelzon 1991) the following representation theorem for an AGM revision operator \star was shown:

Theorem 1 ((Katsuno and Mendelzon 1991)). An operator $\star : \mathcal{L}(\text{At}) \times \mathcal{L}(\text{At}) \rightarrow \mathcal{L}(\text{At})$ is a revision operator iff there exists a faithful mapping $f^* : \mathcal{L}(\text{At}) \rightarrow \wp(\Omega(\text{At}) \times \Omega(\text{At}))$ that maps each formula $\phi \in \mathcal{L}(\text{At})$ to a total preorder s.t.:

$$\text{Mod}(\phi \star \psi) = \min_{f^*(\phi)}(\text{Mod}(\psi)) \quad (1)$$

2.5 Abstract Dialectical Frameworks

We briefly recall some technical details on ADFs following loosely the notation from (Brewka et al. 2013). An ADF D is a tuple $D = (\text{At}, L, C)$ where At is a finite set of atoms, $L \subseteq \text{At} \times \text{At}$ is a set of links, and $C = \{C_s\}_{s \in \text{At}}$ is a set of total functions $C_s : 2^{\text{par}_D(\text{At})} \rightarrow \{\top, \perp\}$ for each $s \in \text{At}$ with $\text{par}_D(s) = \{s' \in \text{At} \mid (s', s) \in L\}$ (also called acceptance functions). An acceptance function C_s defines the cases when the statement s can be accepted (truth value \top), depending on the acceptance status of its parents in D . By abuse of notation, we will often identify an acceptance function C_s by its equivalent *acceptance condition* which models the acceptable cases as a propositional formula. $\mathcal{D}(\text{At})$ denotes the set of all ADFs $D = (\text{At}, L, C)$.

Example 2. We consider the following ADF $D_1 = (\{a, b, c\}, L, C)$ with $L = \{(a, b), (b, a), (a, c), (b, c)\}$ and $C_a = \neg b$ $C_b = \neg a$ $C_c = \neg a \vee \neg b$

Informally, the acceptance conditions can be read as “ a is accepted if b is not accepted”, “ b is accepted if a is not accepted” and “ c is accepted if a is not accepted or b is not accepted”.

An ADF $D = (\text{At}, L, C)$ is interpreted through 3-valued interpretations $\mathcal{V}(\text{At})$. Recall that $\Omega(\text{At})$ consists of all the two-valued interpretations (i.e. interpretations such that for every $s \in \text{At}$, $v(s) \in \{\top, \perp\}$). We define the information order \leq_i over $\{\top, \perp, u\}$ by making u the minimal element: $u <_i \top$ and $u <_i \perp$ and this order is lifted pointwise as follows (given two valuations v, w over At): $v \leq_i w$ iff $v(s) \leq_i w(s)$ for every $s \in \text{At}$. The set of two-valued interpretations extending a valuation v is defined as $[v]^2 = \{w \in \Omega(\text{At}) \mid v \leq_i w\}$. Given a set of valuations V , the consensus operator Π_i is defined as: $\Pi_i V(s) = v(s)$ if for every $v' \in V$, $v(s) = v'(s)$ and $\Pi_i V(s) = u$ otherwise. $\Gamma_D(v) : \text{At} \rightarrow \{\top, \perp, u\}$ where $s \rightarrow \Pi_i \{w(C_s) \mid w \in [v]^2\}$. Thus, $\Gamma_D(v)$ assigns to s the truth-value that all two-valued extensions of v assign to the condition C_s of s , if they agree on C_s , and u otherwise.

Definition 2. Let $D = (\text{At}, L, C)$ be an ADF with $v : \text{At} \rightarrow \{\top, \perp, u\}$ an interpretation:

- v is *admissible* for D iff $v \leq_i \Gamma_D(v)$.
- v is *complete* for D iff $v = \Gamma_D(v)$.
- v is *preferred* for D iff v is \leq_i -maximally complete.
- v is *grounded* for D iff v is \leq_i -minimally complete.

We denote by *admissible*, *complete*(D), *prf*(D), respectively *grounded*(D) the sets of complete, preferred, grounded respectively interpretations of D .

We finally define consequence relations for ADFs:

Definition 3. Given $\text{Sem} \in \{\text{prf}, \text{grounded}\}$, an ADF $D = (\text{At}, L, C)$ and $\phi \in \mathcal{L}^K(\text{At})$ we define: $D \sim_{\text{Sem}}^\cap \phi$ iff $v(\phi) = \top[\perp]$ for all $v \in \text{Sem}(D)$.

Example 3 (Example 2 continued). The ADF of Example 2 has three complete models v_1, v_2, v_3 with:

$$\begin{array}{lll} v_1(a) = \top & v_1(b) = \perp & v_1(c) = \top \\ v_2(a) = \perp & v_2(b) = \top & v_2(c) = \top \\ v_3(a) = u & v_3(b) = u & v_3(c) = u \end{array}$$

v_3 is the grounded interpretation whereas v_1 and v_2 are both preferred.

It will be important to have characterisations of *realizability* of sets of interpretations under some semantics:

Definition 4. Given a set of atoms At , a set of interpretations $\mathcal{V} \subseteq \mathcal{V}(\text{At})$ is *realizable* under semantics Sem iff there exists an ADF $D \in \mathfrak{D}(\text{At})$ s.t. $\text{Sem}(D) = \mathcal{V}$.

(Pührer 2020) shows that a set of interpretations is *realizable* under *prf* iff it is a \leq_i -anti-chain, whereas every (and only) singleton sets are *realizable* under *grounded*:

Proposition 2 ((Pührer 2020)). Given a set of atoms At , (1) a set of interpretations $\mathcal{V} \subseteq \mathcal{V}(\text{At})$ is *realizable* under *prf* iff $\mathcal{V} \neq \emptyset$ and for every $v, v' \in \mathcal{V}$, $v \not\leq_i v'$ and $v' \not\leq_i v$; (2) a set of interpretations $\mathcal{V} \subseteq \mathcal{V}(\text{At})$ is *realizable* under *grounded* iff \mathcal{V} has cardinality 1.

3 ADF-revisions for Trivalent Semantics

In this section, we study revision of ADFs by formulas under trivalent semantics, in particular the preferred and grounded semantics. We define in Section 3.1 postulates for revision operators under trivalent semantics, which we characterise in terms of total preorders over three-valued interpretations for the preferred semantics (Section 3.3) and the grounded semantics (Section 3.4).

3.1 ADF-revision under Trivalent Semantics: Postulates and Semantics

In this section we define a new approach to revision of ADFs for three-valued semantics. In more detail, we define an operator \star that allows to revise an ADF (under some three-valued semantics) by a formula in the language \mathcal{L}^K .² In other words, $\star : \mathfrak{D}(\text{At}) \times \mathcal{L}^K(\text{At}) \rightarrow \mathfrak{D}(\text{At})$. We adapt the AGM-postulates for propositional revision described in Section 2.4 to revision operators for ADFs in the following way:

Definition 5. An operator \star is a *trivalent ADF revision operator* (in short, ADF_\star^3 -operator) for a semantics Sem iff \star satisfies (for any $\phi, \psi, \mu \in \mathcal{L}^K$):

- ($\text{ADF}_\star^3 1$) $D \star \psi \sim_{\text{Sem}}^\cap \psi$.³
- ($\text{ADF}_\star^3 2$) If $\text{Sem}(D) \cap \mathcal{V}(\psi) \neq \emptyset$ then $\text{Sem}(D \star \psi) = \text{Sem}(D) \cap \mathcal{V}(\psi)$.
- ($\text{ADF}_\star^3 3$) If $\mathcal{V}(\psi) \neq \emptyset$ then $\text{Sem}(D \star \psi) \neq \emptyset$.
- ($\text{ADF}_\star^3 4$) If $\text{Sem}(D) = \text{Sem}(D')$ and $\psi \equiv_K \psi'$ then $\text{Sem}(D \star \psi) = \text{Sem}(D' \star \psi')$.
- ($\text{ADF}_\star^3 5$) $\text{Sem}(D \star \psi) \cap \mathcal{V}(\mu) \subseteq \text{Sem}(D \star (\psi \wedge \mu))$.
- ($\text{ADF}_\star^3 6$) If $\text{Sem}(D \star \psi) \cap \mathcal{V}(\mu) \neq \emptyset$, then $\text{Sem}(D \star (\psi \wedge \mu)) \subseteq \text{Sem}(D \star \psi) \cap \mathcal{V}(\mu)$.

We explain these postulates as follows: $\text{ADF}_\star^3 1$ requires that the formula ψ by which one revises is derivable in every Sem interpretation of the revised ADF. The second postulate $\text{ADF}_\star^3 2$ can perhaps be better understood in its syntactical reformulation: If $D \not\sim_{\text{Sem}}^\cap \psi$, i.e. if D has at least one Sem -interpretation that satisfies ψ , then $D \star \psi$ has as Sem -interpretations exactly the Sem -interpretations of D that satisfy ψ . $\text{ADF}_\star^3 3$ says that if we revise by a consistent formula, the resulting ADF will also admit Sem -interpretations. $\text{ADF}_\star^3 4$ is a postulate of syntax-independence, which states that revising ADFs with the same Sem -interpretations by K -equivalent formulas results in Sem -equivalent revised ADFs. Finally, $\text{ADF}_\star^3 5$ and $\text{ADF}_\star^3 6$ are direct adaptations of the *super-* and *sub-expansion postulates*. They require, in the non-trivial case where $D \star \psi \not\sim_{\text{Sem}}^\cap \mu$, that the Sem -interpretations of $D \star (\psi \wedge \mu)$ are exactly the Sem -interpretations of $D \star \psi$ that satisfy μ .

The main question we answer in the rest of this section is whether ADF_\star^3 -operators can be characterised semantically analogously to propositional revision operators (Theorem 1). The central concept for such a characterisation will

²Recall, $\mathcal{L}^K(\text{At})$ is the language based on At , the unary connectives $\{\neg, \sim, \odot\}$ and the binary connectives $\{\wedge, \vee, \rightarrow\}$

³Or, equivalently, $\text{Sem}(D \star \psi) \subseteq \mathcal{V}(\psi)$.

be that of a *faithful mapping* of ADFs to total preorders over $\mathcal{V}(\text{At})$:

Definition 6. Given a semantics Sem and an ADF $D = (\text{At}, L, C)$, a mapping $f : \mathcal{D}(\text{At}) \rightarrow \wp(\mathcal{V}(\text{At}) \times \mathcal{V}(\text{At}))$ associating a total preorder \preceq_D to every ADF D is a *faithful mapping* for semantics Sem if, for every $D \in \mathcal{D}(\text{At})$ and for every $v_1, v_2 \in \mathcal{V}(\text{At})$:

1. if $v_1 \in \text{Sem}(D)$ then $v_1 \preceq_D v_2$; and
2. if $v_1 \in \text{Sem}(D)$ and $v_2 \notin \text{Sem}(D)$ then $v_1 \prec_D v_2$; and
3. if $\text{Sem}(D) = \text{Sem}(D')$ then $\preceq_D = \preceq_{D'}$.

A faithful mapping is in general not sufficient to ensure a characterisation of ADF_*^3 -operators. The main problem is that a faithful mapping does not ensure that a selection of \preceq_D -minimal interpretations that satisfy ϕ are realizable by some ADF $D \star \phi \in \mathcal{D}(\text{At})$ under the semantics under consideration. In the following subsections, we investigate whether and how such realizability can be ensured by imposing additional conditions on faithful mappings. We shall see (in Section 3.2) that in general, such conditions cannot be found, by showing that for admissible and complete semantics no ADF_*^3 -operator satisfying all postulates exists. Thereafter, we shall provide conditions and corresponding characterisation theorems for preferred (Section 3.3) and grounded (Section 3.4) semantics.

Remark 1. We have carried out a study similar to the one developed below for two-valued semantics such as the two-valued models and stable models. In view of space limitations, we merely remark here that the developments are entirely analogous to the development of revision under three-value semantics: AGM-like revisions under a selected two-valued semantics can be characterized in terms of faithful mappings of ADFs to preorders, imposing additional conditions to ensure realizability of every selection of possible worlds.

3.2 Impossibility of Rational Revision under Admissible and Complete Semantics

In this section, we show that a revision operator that satisfies ADF_*^3 1- ADF_*^3 6 for the admissible or complete semantics does not exist. In particular, we show that no revision operator can satisfy ADF_*^3 2. A similar result can be found in (Diller et al. 2018, Proposition 2) for revision of abstract argumentation frameworks under complete semantics. Intuitively, the reason that no revision operator satisfying ADF_*^3 2 for these semantics exists is that not every subset of $\text{Sem}(D)$ is realizable under Sem for $\text{Sem} \in \{\text{complete}, \text{admissible}\}$. For example, a set not containing the interpretation that sets $v(s) = u$ for every $s \in \text{At}$ is not realizable under admissible semantics. Thus, if we revise D by ϕ that is satisfied by exactly such a subset, ADF_*^3 2 forces $\text{Sem}(D \star \phi)$ to equal a non-realizable set of interpretations.

Proposition 3. There is no operator $\star : \mathcal{D}(\text{At}) \times \mathcal{L}^k(\text{At}) \rightarrow \mathcal{D}(\text{At})$ that satisfies ADF_*^3 2 for $\text{Sem} = \text{complete}$ or $\text{Sem} = \text{admissible}$.

Proof. Suppose towards a contradiction that ADF_*^3 2 holds for an operator \star for $\text{Sem} \in \{\text{complete}, \text{admissible}\}$. Notice that $\text{complete}(D) = \{u, \top, \perp\} = \text{admissible}(D)$. Consider the revision $D \star (a \vee \neg a)$. Since $\mathcal{V}(a \vee \neg a) = \{\top, \perp\}$, $\mathcal{V}(a \vee \neg a) \cap \text{Sem}(D) \neq \emptyset$ for $\text{Sem} \in \{\text{complete}, \text{admissible}\}$, and thus, with our supposition that ADF_*^3 2 holds for \star under Sem , $\text{Sem}(D \star (a \vee \neg a)) = \text{Sem}(D) \cap \mathcal{V}(a \vee \neg a) = \{\top, \perp\}$. But there is no ADF $D \star (a \vee \neg a) \in \mathcal{D}(\{a\})$ s.t. $\text{Sem}(D \star (a \vee \neg a)) = \{\top, \perp\}$, i.e. the result of this revision is not realizable under Sem . To see this for $\text{Sem} = \text{admissible}$, it suffices to observe that $u \in \text{admissible}(D')$ for any $D' \in \mathcal{D}(\{a\})$. To see this for $\text{Sem} = \text{complete}$, it suffices to observe that there exists for any ADF a unique \leq_i -minimal complete extension (Brewka et al. 2013). However, $\{\top, \perp\}$ does not contain a unique \leq_i -minimal element. \square

3.3 Revision of ADFs under Preferred Semantics

In this section, we give a semantical characterisation of revision operators for preferred semantics, in terms of *i-modular faithful mappings* (imf-mappings). The following example shows that faithful mappings do not always lead to a sound semantical characterisation of ADF_*^3 -revision operators for preferred semantics:

Example 4. We show that a naive adaption of Dalal's revision operator (Dalal 1988) does not lead to a well-defined revision operator. We use the symmetric distance function Δ defined between truth-values as follows: $\top \Delta \perp = 1$, $\top \Delta u = \perp \Delta u = 0.5$ and $x \Delta x = 0$ for any $x \in \{\top, \perp, u\}$ (cf. (Strass 2014)). We then lift this to interpretations $v, v' \in \mathcal{V}(\text{At})$ as follows: $v \Delta v' = \sum_{s \in \text{At}} v(s) \Delta v'(s)$. Defining a faithful preorder \preceq_D based solely on this distance function (e.g. by setting $v_1 \preceq_D^{\text{prf}, \Delta} v_2$ iff $\min_{v \in \text{prf}(D)} (v \Delta v_1) \leq \min_{v \in \text{prf}(D)} (v \Delta v_2)$) would not result in a selection realizable under prf , since there could be $\preceq_D^{\text{prf}, \Delta}$ -equal interpretations that are not \leq_i -incompatible.

Take e.g. the ADF D_1 from Example 2. Notice that $\text{prf}(D) = \{\top \perp \top, \perp \top \top\}$ and $\top u u, \top \perp \perp \in \min_{\preceq_D^{\text{prf}, \Delta}} \mathcal{V}(a \wedge \sim b \wedge \sim c)$. Revising D with $a \wedge \sim b \wedge \sim c$ would thus result in an ADF $D_1 \star a \wedge \sim b \wedge \sim c$ which has $\top u u$ and $\top \perp \perp$ among its preferred extensions, which is impossible in view of Proposition 2, since $\top u u$ and $\top \perp \perp$ are not \leq_i -incompatible.

To avoid selections of interpretations that are non-realizable under preferred semantics like in Example 4, an additional condition on faithful mappings has to be imposed. This condition we call *i-modularity*, and requires that every \preceq_D -layer is an \leq_i -antichain, i.e. all interpretations in a \preceq_D -layer are \leq_i -incompatible. We denote, for a preorder \preceq , $v \preceq v'$ and $v' \preceq v$ as $v \approx v'$.

Definition 7. Given a semantics Sem and an ADF $D = (\text{At}, L, C)$, a mapping $f : \mathcal{D}(\text{At}) \rightarrow \wp(\mathcal{V}(\text{At}) \times \mathcal{V}(\text{At}))$ associating a total preorder \preceq_D to every ADF D is an *i-modular faithful mapping* (imf-mapping) for semantics Sem if it is faithful w.r.t. Sem and for every $D \in \mathcal{D}(\text{At})$ and every $v_1, v_2 \in \mathcal{V}(\text{At})$: if $v_1 \approx_D v_2$ then $v_1 \not\prec_i v_2$ and $v_2 \not\prec_i v_1$.

Definition 8. Given a semantics Sem and an ADF $D = (\text{At}, L, C)$, a mapping $f : \mathfrak{D}(\text{At}) \rightarrow \wp(\mathcal{V}(\text{At}) \times \mathcal{V}(\text{At}))$ associating a total preorder \preceq_D to every ADF D is an *anti-symmetric faithful mapping* (asf-mapping for semantics Sem if it is faithful w.r.t. Sem and for every $D \in \mathfrak{D}(\text{At})$ and for every $v_1, v_2 \in \mathcal{V}(\text{At})$: if $v_1 \approx_D v_2$ then $v_1 = v_2$).

We now show that ADF_*^3 -operator for the grounded semantics can be characterized by asf-mappings. The proof of this Theorem is analogous to the proof of Theorem 2, besides that realizability of $D \star \phi$ now corresponds to the anti-symmetry condition.

Theorem 3. An operator $\star : \mathfrak{D}(\text{At}) \times \mathcal{L}^K(\text{At}) \rightarrow \mathcal{L}^K(\text{At})$ is an ADF_*^3 -operator for grounded iff there exists a function $f^* : \mathfrak{D}(\text{At}) \rightarrow \wp(\mathcal{V}(\text{At}) \times \mathcal{V}(\text{At}))$ that is asf-faithful w.r.t. grounded s.t.:

$$\text{grounded}(D \star \psi) = \min_{f^*(D)}(\mathcal{V}(\psi)) \quad (3)$$

4 Nonmonotonic Inference and Defeasible Conditionals for ADFs

In this section, we study interrelations between ADF_*^3 -operators, trivalent defeasible conditionals and nonmonotonic inference based on three-valued logic. We first define nonmonotonic inference based on three-valued logic and show how they can be equivalently viewed as trivalent defeasible conditionals. Thereafter, we define both *static conditionals* and *dynamic conditionals* for ADFs, which are defined using the Ramsey test on the basis of the revision operators defined and studied above. Finally, we show that the interrelations between revision, conditionals and inference relations known from propositional beliefs hold also in our argumentative setting.

4.1 Three-valued Nonmonotonic Inference and Defeasible Conditionals

Nonmonotonic inference on the basis of three-valued logics such as \mathcal{K} can be defined completely analogously to the two-valued case, by specifying total preorders \preceq that express a comparative measure of plausibility over the set of three-valued interpretations. We can then easily generalize the definition of conditional entailment to sets of three-valued interpretations. Given a set of atoms At , we assume a total preorders \preceq over $\mathcal{V}(\text{At})$. We can now define conditional entailment based on Kleene's three-valued logics as follows:

Definition 9. Given a set of atoms At , a total preorder \preceq over $\mathcal{V}(\text{At})$, and some $\phi, \psi \in \mathcal{L}^K(\text{At})$, $\phi \sim_{\preceq}^K \psi$ iff $v \prec v'$ for some $v \in \min_{\preceq}(\mathcal{V}(\phi \wedge \psi))$ and $v' \in \min_{\preceq}(\mathcal{V}(\phi \wedge \sim\psi))$.⁶

Notice the choice of negation in the definition above. This is to ensure that an inference $\phi \sim_{\preceq}^K \psi$ is valid iff all \preceq -minimal worlds that validate ϕ validate ψ . That using \sim in the above definition of conditional inference ensures this is shown by the following fact:

⁶Since \preceq is a total order, we can equivalently replace any of the two existential quantifiers expressed by "for some" by a universal quantifier.

Fact 4. $\phi \sim_{\preceq}^K \psi$ iff $\min_{\preceq} \mathcal{V}(\phi) \subseteq \mathcal{V}(\psi)$.

This fact shows that, just like in the case of classical nonmonotonic inference relations, three-valued nonmonotonic inference relations obtained on the basis of a total preorder can be equivalently viewed as conditional inference relations on the basis of the selection function \min_{\preceq} . In other words, conditionals $(\psi|\phi)$, defined on the basis of the selection function \min_{\preceq} can be simply seen as the syntactic counterparts of the nonmonotonic inference relation \sim_{\preceq}^K .

We show that any inference relation based on a total preorder over $\mathcal{V}(\text{At})$ satisfies (REF), (CUT), (CM), (RW), (LLE), (OR) and a postulate we call *weak Rational Monotony* (wRM):

(wRM) $\phi \sim \gamma$ and $\phi \not\sim \psi$ implies $\phi \wedge \psi \sim \gamma$

In the context of three-valued logics, the difference between (RM) and (wRM) is the following: the antecedent of (wRM) requires that from ϕ , neither $\odot\psi$ nor $\neg\psi$ can be derived, i.e. if ϕ then normally ψ is neither false nor undecided. (RM), on the other hand, has a weaker antecedent, namely that $\neg\psi$ cannot be derived, i.e. normally ψ is not false if ϕ is accepted.

Analogously to Proposition 1, nonmonotonic inference relations induced by total preorders over three-valued interpretation satisfies all the KLM-postulates as well as the non-Horn postulate (wRM):

Proposition 4. Given a set of atoms At and a total preorder \preceq over $\mathcal{V}(\text{At})$, \sim_{\preceq}^K satisfies (REF), (CUT), (CM), (RW), (LLE), (OR) and (wRM).

We show now that there are total preorders for which (RM) might be violated:

Example 7. Consider a preorder \preceq over $\mathcal{V}(\{a, b\})$ s.t. $\top u \prec \top \top$. Then $a \sim_{\preceq}^K \odot b$ and $a \not\sim_{\preceq}^K \neg b$ yet $a \wedge b \not\sim_{\preceq}^K \odot b$.

Altogether, we can conclude that the basic ideas for obtaining nonmonotonic conditional inferences and defeasible inference relations known from propositional logic can be taken over to the three-valued setting, but some subtle differences (e.g. (wRM) vs (RM)) distinguish the resulting inference relations from their two-valued counterparts.

4.2 Defeasible Conditional Inference for ADFs

In this section we study various ways of obtaining conditional inference relations on the basis of ADFs, and relate these conditional inference relations to revision and defeasible inference relations.

We first define *static conditional inference relations*, which treat the interpretations selected by some semantics given an ADF as equally plausible, and any other interpretation as implausible or even impossible. An ADF D therefore implies a static conditional $\phi \Rightarrow \psi$ (given some semantics Sem), if there is an interpretation in $\text{Sem}(D)$ that validates ϕ , and every interpretation in $\text{Sem}(D)$ that validates ϕ also validates ψ .

Definition 10. Let an ADF $D = (\text{At}, L, C)$, some semantics Sem and some $\phi, \psi \in \mathcal{L}^K(\text{At})$ be given. $D \sim_{\text{Sem}}^{\text{st}} \phi \Rightarrow \psi$ iff:

- there is some $v \in \mathbf{Sem}(D)$ s.t. $v(\phi) = \top$, and
- for every $v \in \mathbf{Sem}(D)$ s.t. $v(\phi) = \top$, $v(\psi) = \top$.

Example 8. Consider again D_1 from Example 2. We have e.g. $D_1 \vdash_{\text{prf}}^{\text{st}} \top \Rightarrow c$, $\neg b \Rightarrow a$, $\neg a \Rightarrow b$.

Remark 4. In a two-valued propositional setting, static conditionals can be defined as follows: $\delta \vdash^{\text{st}} \phi \Rightarrow \psi$ iff $\delta \not\vdash \neg\phi$ (i.e. $\Omega(\delta) \cap \Omega(\phi) \neq \emptyset$) and $\delta \vdash \phi \rightarrow \psi$ (or equivalently: $\delta \wedge \phi \vdash \psi$).

Static conditional inference relations, however, are rather weak, since their antecedents are restricted to formulas that are implied by at least one interpretation selected by \mathbf{Sem} . For example, $D_1 \not\vdash_{\text{prf}}^{\text{st}} \neg c \Rightarrow \phi$ for any $\phi \in \mathcal{L}^K(\{a, b, c\})$, not even $\neg c \Rightarrow \top$. Therefore, we introduce now dynamic conditional inference relations, based on revisions of ADFs. We construct a conditional inference relation for ADFs based on the *Ramsey test*, going back to (Ramsey 1931):

If two people are arguing “If p , then q ?” and are both in doubt as to p , they are adding p hypothetically to their stock of knowledge and arguing on that basis about q ;

Based on this idea, we can simply state that the conditional $(\psi|\phi)$ is derivable from the ADF D , or, equivalently (in view of Fact 4) the conditional $(\psi|\phi)$ is valid in view of D , given a semantics \mathbf{Sem} and some revision operator \star iff ψ is derivable in the revised ADF $D \star \phi$ under the semantics \mathbf{Sem} :

Definition 11. Given an ADF D and a revision operator \star , $D \vdash_{\mathbf{Sem}}^{\star}(\psi|\phi)$ iff $D \star \phi \vdash_{\mathbf{Sem}} \psi$.

We can show that static conditional inference relations are weaker than dynamic conditional inference relations, according to any ADF_{\star}^3 -operator:

Proposition 5. Let an ADF D , some semantics \mathbf{Sem} and an ADF_{\star}^3 -revision operator (for the semantics \mathbf{Sem}) be given. Then $D \vdash_{\mathbf{Sem}}^{\text{st}} \phi \Rightarrow \psi$ implies $D \vdash_{\mathbf{Sem}}^{\star}(\psi|\phi)$.

We first show that dynamic conditional inference relations based on revision of ADFs can be seen as a special case of three-valued conditional inference relations. We do this by showing that, given a ADF_{\star}^3 -operator \star , the corresponding total preorder $f^{\star}(D)$ gives rise to an inference relation $\vdash_{f^{\star}(D)}^K$ equivalent to the conditionals $\vdash_{\mathbf{Sem}}^{\star}$ -derivable from D .

Proposition 6. Given an ADF D , some semantics $\mathbf{Sem} \in \{\text{prf}, \text{grounded}\}$ and an ADF_{\star}^3 -operator \star satisfying $(\text{ADF}_{\star}^3 1)$ - $(\text{ADF}_{\star}^3 6)$, $D \vdash_{\mathbf{Sem}}^{\star}(\psi|\phi)$ iff $\phi \vdash_{f^{\star}(D)}^K \psi$.

From this connection between dynamic conditionals and three-valued nonmonotonic inference relations, we can show that dynamic conditionals (or their equivalent formulation as nonmonotonic inference relations) satisfy all the KLM-postulates and (wRM):

Corollary 1. Let an ADF D , some semantics $\mathbf{Sem} \in \{\text{prf}, \text{grounded}\}$ and a ADF_{\star}^3 -operator \star for \mathbf{Sem} be given. Then $\vdash_{f^{\star}(D)}^K$ satisfies (REF), (CUT), (CM), (RW), (LLE), (OR) and (wRM).

We illustrate these conditional inference relations with some conditionals derived from Example 5:

Example 9 (Example 5 continued). Where \star is the operator based on $\preceq_D^{\text{prf}, d+i}$ and D_1 is as in Example 5, we see that e.g. $\sim c \vdash_{D_1, \star}^{\text{Sem}} \neg c$ and $a \vdash_{D_1, \star}^{\text{Sem}} \neg a \wedge c$. Notice that also e.g. $c \vdash_{D_1, \star}^{\text{Sem}} C_c$ (i.e. $c \vdash_{D_1, \star}^{\text{Sem}} \neg a \vee \neg b$) and $C_c \vdash_{D_1, \star}^{\text{Sem}} c$. In fact for any $s \in \{a, b, c\}$, $s \vdash_{D_1, \star}^{\text{Sem}} C_s$ and $C_s \vdash_{D_1, \star}^{\text{Sem}} s$.

The syntactical structure of an ADF is not always preserved by the dynamic conditional inference relation:

Example 10. Let $D = (\{a\}, L, C_a = \neg a)$ and consider the preorder $u \prec \top \prec \perp$. It can be easily shown that there exists an i-modular mapping f s.t. $f(D) = \prec$. However, $a \not\vdash_{D, \star}^{\text{Sem}} \neg a$ and $\neg a \not\vdash_{D, \star}^{\text{Sem}} a$. A similar, but more involving example without a self-attacking argument for which a similar claim holds is: $D' = (\{a, b, c\}, L, C_a = \neg b, C_b = \neg c, C_c = \neg a)$.

5 Related Works

To the best of our knowledge, no papers detailing conditional inference from argumentative formalisms on the basis of the Ramsey test have been published before. we discuss related works that treat either revision or conditional inference in argumentative formalisms.

Revision of ADFs is investigated in (Linsbichler and Woltran 2016a), where revision of ADFs by other ADFs are defined. Conceptually, our approach is able to capture the approach by (Linsbichler and Woltran 2016a) since we allow for revisions of ADFs under three-valued semantics by any \mathcal{L}^K , which allows to express revision by a set of interpretations \mathcal{V}' as revision by the formula $\bigvee \mathcal{V}'$. Technically, there is some incomparability between our approach and that of (Linsbichler and Woltran 2016a) caused by the difference in the type of revision we consider. In particular, there are differences in the way the issue of realizability is handled. We have chosen to handle this issue by ensuring that any subset of a \preceq_D -layer is realizable under a given semantics, whereas (Linsbichler and Woltran 2016a) handles this issue by defining revisions of the ADF D by another ADF as $f_{\mathbf{Sem}}(\min_{\preceq_D} \mathbf{Sem}(F))$, where the function $f_{\mathbf{Sem}}(\mathcal{V}')$ returns \mathcal{V}' if it is realizable under \mathcal{V}' and the interpretation v_u ⁷ otherwise.

Revisions of abstract argumentation are considered in many works, including (Cayrol, de St-Cyr, and Lagasquie-Schiex 2008; Falappa, Kern-Isberner, and Simari 2009; Coste-Marquis et al. 2014; Baumann and Brewka 2015; Linsbichler and Woltran 2016b; Delobelle, Konieczny, and Vesic 2015; Delobelle et al. 2016; Mailly 2015; Linsbichler 2017). In (Diller et al. 2018), revisions of argumentation frameworks by both propositional formulas and other argumentation frameworks (represented as sets of extensions according to some semantics) are defined indirectly by specifying the set of extensions (according to some semantics). Thus, conceptually, we provide generalisations of both these kinds of revisions, as we allow for revisions by any formula in the language \mathcal{L}^K , which allows to represent sets of extensions. With regards to the differences between revision

⁷Recall that $v_u(s) = u$ for every $s \in \text{At}$.

of abstract argumentation frameworks and abstract dialectical frameworks, we conjecture that we can characterise revisions of abstract argumentation frameworks as revisions of ADFs. (Coste-Marquis et al. 2014) allow for revision of sets of argumentation frameworks by propositional formulas, resulting in a set of argumentation frameworks. The postulates governing such revisions are adaptations of the AGM-postulates similar to both ours and those of (Diller et al. 2018), even though both (Diller et al. 2018) and we consider revisions of single abstract argumentation resp. dialectical frameworks. Restricting attention to single frameworks has as an effect that realizability is an essential concern, which (Coste-Marquis et al. 2014) avoid. Furthermore, we are more general in the sense we study revision of ADFs, which can capture argumentation frameworks, by formulas in \mathcal{L}^K , which includes propositional formulas as a special case.

A number of works have studied the conditional inferential behaviour of formal argumentation formalisms. In structured argumentation, there are a number of works that study KLM-like properties of argumentative inference relations (Borg, Straßer, and Arieli 2020; Heyninck and Arieli 2018; Heyninck and Straßer 2020; Čyras and Toni 2015; Cyras and Toni 2016; Li, Oren, and Parsons 2017). These work differ both in host formalism (various formalisms for structured argumentation versus ADFs) and the way conditional inference is defined. Whereas we define conditional inference using the Ramsey-test, these works consider a conditional $(\psi|\phi)$ to be justified if, after addition of ϕ to the knowledge base (sometimes as a strict premise, sometimes as a defeasible premise), ψ is derivable according to the chosen argumentative inference relation. These works do not agree on how exactly ϕ is added, i.e. in some works it is added as a defeasible premise whereas in other works it is added as a strict premise.

In (Rienstra 2014, Chapter 3) a type of entailment for abstract argumentation frameworks is defined which has similarities to the work done in our paper. Entailments are based on *interventions* of argumentation frameworks, inspired by interventions in Bayesian networks. Interventions of argumentation frameworks allow to enforce a labelling status of an argument by adding new arguments that attack the argument whose labelling status is to be intervened. Given an argumentation framework F , an entailment relation based on such interventions is then defined by stating that $\Psi \sim_{\sigma}^F \phi$ iff after the intervention Ψ , ϕ is true according to all σ -labellings of the argumentation framework that is the result of the intervention Ψ on F . (Rienstra 2014) studies several properties of such inference relations, include the KLM-properties, for which it is shown that for restricted classes of interventions, some semantics satisfy cautious monotony, cut and rational monotony. Another approach is that of *conditional acceptance functions* (Booth et al. 2012), where, given an argumentation framework, the usual labelling semantics are changed as to account for abductive or counterfactual reasoning. In (Booth et al. 2013) conditional inference relations for abstract argumentation frameworks are defined on the basis of a propositional language built up from

atoms in_s , out_s and u_s for every argument s , which encode argument labels. Nonmonotonic inference relations are then defined semantically by a total preorder over models for this language by preferring models that model labellings that “satisfy better” the constraints of a selected semantics (given the argumentation framework under consideration). Our work takes a different approach to the definition of conditional inference relation by using the Ramsey-test, and is more general since ADFs subsume abstract argumentation.

6 Conclusion

In this paper we defined dynamic conditional inference relations for ADFs based on the Ramsey test, and developed a new approach to revision of an ADF by formulas to achieve this. We have shown that such conditional inference relations satisfy all the usual rationality postulates for conditional inferences and extend static conditionals but also give rise to subtle differences with the propositional case, as witnessed e.g. by the (wRM)-postulate. What comes out clearly from this work is that revision, or more generally belief change, is the platform that allowed us to bridge the gap between argumentative reasoning and conditional inference. As such, we hope that this work will serve as an inspiration for further investigations into the combination and cross-fertilization between argumentative and nonmonotonic conditional reasoning. Indeed, rather than a definitive statement on dynamic conditional inference for ADFs, we see this paper as an anchor point for further research on revision, nonmonotonic inference and dynamic conditional argumentative reasoning. When generalizing these interconnected concepts, there are many choices to be made, such as which “monotonic base logic” to use (in our case: K), which postulates for revision to use (e.g. the approach of (Katsuno and Mendelzon 1991) vs alternative types of revision (Fermé and Hansson 2018)), how exactly to adapt the postulates for revision and the corresponding faithful mappings (e.g. equivalence vs strong equivalence). Even though the choices we made are well-motivated, they are clearly not the only viable ones. It remains to be seen whether the interconnections between revision, inference and conditionals generalize to such a setting.

In future work, we plan to study the impact of changes in the choices made in this paper as outlined above, as well as look at more specific revision operators (Kern-Isberner 2001). Furthermore, we plan to look deeper into the semantical nature of revisions defined in this work. Indeed, a revised ADF is only defined in terms of its models (according to a chosen semantics). What is not specified is how we can obtain the revised ADF in terms of changes (be it revisions or otherwise) of the original ADF, and in particular its conditions. We plan to investigate how this semantical perspective can be supplemented with a characterisation of revision of ADFs in terms of change of the acceptance conditions of the revised ADF. For such investigations, iterated revision (Kern-Isberner 2004; Darwiche and Pearl 1997) might prove relevant, due to its well-established connections with conditional change. Finally, we will investigate the complexity of the revision operators from Example 5.

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