Cindy Friedman

Student Type: MA

IBS SCHOLARSHIP STUDENT.
DEGREES LINKED TO THIS RESEARCH GROUP:
1) 2019-2020 Masters of Arts (Philosophy): 'The Ethics of Artificially Intelligent Sexbots: A Philosophical Investigation into the Ethical Conditions for Human-Sexbot Interaction';
2) 2018 BA (Honours) (Philosophy): 'The ethics of artificial intelligence: Should artificially intelligent social robots be used as slaves?'.

TALKS:
1) 'The ethics of artificial intelligence: Should artificially intelligent social robots be used as slaves?' (PSSA 2019);
2) 'The application of ethical boundaries for social robots: a human perspective' (4IR: Philosophical, Ethical & Legal Dimensions 2019);
3) 'The application of ethical boundaries for social robots: a human perspective' (PPA 2019);
4) 'Ethical boundaries for android companion robots: a human perspective' (FAIR 2019).

PUBLICATIONS:
1) Friedman, C. 2019. 'Ethical boundaries for android companion robots: A human perspective'. Proceedings of the South African Forum for Artificial Intelligence Research Vol 2540. http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2540/.

Publications

2020

Friedman, C. . (2020). Human-Robot Moral Relations: Human Interactants as Moral Patients of Their Own Agential Moral Actions Towards Robots. Communications in Computer and Information Science , 1342. http://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66151-9_1

Abstract BibTex Entry BibTeX Download PDF

501779_1_En_1_Chapter_OnlinePDF.pdf

This paper contributes to the debate in the ethics of social robots on how or whether to treat social robots morally by way of considering a novel perspective on the moral relations between human interactants and social robots. This perspective is significant as it allows us to circumnavigate debates about the (im)possibility of robot consciousness and moral patiency (debates which often slow down discussion on the ethics of HRI), thus allowing us to address actual and urgent current ethical issues in relation to human-robot interaction. The paper considers the different ways in which human interactants may be moral patients in the context of interaction with social robots: robots as conduits of human moral action towards human moral patients; humans as moral patients to the actions of robots; and human interactants as moral patients of their own agential moral actions towards social robots. This third perspective is the focal point of the paper. The argument is that due to perceived robot consciousness, and the possibility that the immoral treatment of social robots may morally harm human interactants, there is a unique moral relation between humans and social robots wherein human interactants are both the moral agents of their actions towards robots, as well as the actual moral patients of those agential moral actions towards robots. Robots, however, are no more than perceived moral patients. This discussion further adds to debates in the context of robot moral status, and the consideration of the moral treatment of robots in the context of human-robot interaction.

@article{385,
  author = {Cindy Friedman},
  title = {Human-Robot Moral Relations: Human Interactants as Moral Patients of Their Own Agential Moral Actions Towards Robots},
  abstract = {This paper contributes to the debate in the ethics of social robots on how or whether to treat social robots morally by way of considering a novel perspective on the moral relations between human interactants and social robots. This perspective is significant as it allows us to circumnavigate debates about the (im)possibility of robot consciousness and moral patiency (debates which often slow down discussion on the ethics of HRI), thus allowing us to address actual and urgent current ethical issues in relation to human-robot interaction. The paper considers the different ways in which human interactants may be moral patients in the context of interaction with social robots: robots as conduits of human moral action towards human moral patients; humans as moral patients to the actions of robots; and human interactants as moral patients of their own agential moral actions towards social robots. This third perspective is the focal point of the paper. The argument is that due to perceived robot consciousness, and the possibility that the immoral treatment of social robots may morally harm human interactants, there is a unique moral relation between humans and social robots wherein human interactants are both the moral agents of their actions towards robots, as well as the actual moral patients of those agential moral actions towards robots. Robots, however, are no more than perceived moral patients. This discussion further adds to debates in the context of robot moral status, and the consideration of the moral treatment of robots in the context of human-robot interaction.},
  year = {2020},
  journal = {Communications in Computer and Information Science},
  volume = {1342},
  pages = {3-20},
  publisher = {Springer},
  isbn = {978-3-030-66151-9},
  url = {https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-66151-9_1},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66151-9_1},
}